Ian Shiah (Associate Editor)

Marital rape provokes strong emotions among many. Many would sympathise with victims of family violence, particularly victims of sexual abuse. There is an active movement in Singapore to repeal the marital rape exemption (www.notorape.com), and supporters include Eunice Olsen and Prof. Chan Wing Cheong.

The abolitionists appear correct at first glance. Rape, after all, is rape. Why should marriage make it anything less?

In PP v. N, [1999] 4 Sing. L.R. 619 [PP v. N], a man stripped his wife, tied her hands together with a towel and forced her against her will. Because of the exemption, the man could not be charged with rape.

Being raped by one’s husband should not be thought of as a less traumatic experience than being raped by a stranger. In fact, it might lead to a sense of betrayal and possibly greater damage. As NMPs Eunice Olsen and Siew Kum Hong passionately argued in Parliament in 2007, women are not their husband’s property. The critical issue is consent. Sex without consent is rape. If the law does not excuse husbands who assault their wives, why should it then allow them to rape?

We should thus follow the ‘enlightened’ approach of countries like the USA, UK, and India in removing the marital rape exemption.

Convinced?

The practical approach taken in Singapore is not without merit. Retaining the exemption is to strike a balance between conjugal rights and the protection of wives from marital rape. The government is primarily concerned with the effect laws would have on society. A law cannot be repealed on the sole basis that a good number of people feel it is wrong.  Besides, the law does not like to intrude into the marital bedroom.

With the amendment of s. 375 (4), a woman may take clear steps to signify her withdrawal of consent to sex. The simple application for a Personal Protection Order (which can be done at 5 locations including the Family Court) prevents a husband from relying on the marital rape exemption. Section 375(4) seeks to protect the wives, not the husbands.

In the UK, where marital rape is a crime, it is still not easy to prove the absence of consent because consent need not be given right before intercourse. Therefore, the practical result would be similar to that of Singapore: no conviction of rape. Women in the UK are not accorded more protection simply because marital rape is a crime.

In PP v. N, it might seem that the courts could not have done anything for the woman who was ‘raped’ by her husband. However, examining it more closely would reveal that the accused was sentenced to 18 months of jail for voluntary causing hurt. If the courts felt that not being able to charge the accused for rape was unjust, should it not then impose the maximum sentence of 2 years?

Education, counselling and empowerment of women should be the appropriate approach in preventing family violence and abuse. The law cannot do wonders in navigating the delicate balance between intrusion into the private lives of citizens and protecting abused wives.